Tragic undercurrents, figured both as primal sufferings and as literary coping with sufferings, course through Thoreau’s writing, especially in some of his lesser-read works, and prominently in his *Journals*. “If it is not a tragical life we live, then I know not what to call it”.¹ These dark currents surface in his first book, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, written as a memorial to his older brother. John had died in Henry’s arms, suffering a tortured death from lockjaw. This tragic strain also surfaces in his description, in *Cape Cod*, of approaching a partially buried and decomposed corpse abandoned in the sand after a deadly wreck, a body we take to be Margaret Fuller’s.² We find it also in his impassioned defense of the martyred anti-slavery militant, John Brown.³ Attending to these tragic undertows gives his steady affirmations a higher pitch of accomplishment and urgency, and also gives a new angle on his concept of the wild. Thoreau’s theme of the wild is pluriform, but one of its dimensions is related to tragedy and to what Nietzsche calls the Dionysian. Thoreau’s writing is a way to resist tragedy as raw suffering and to redeem the world through art, making life sufferable, as the Nietzsche of *The Birth of Tragedy* claims it can. From the midst of inescapable afflictions, writing can open into the sublime and

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² *Cape Cod*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1961, Chapter 6, p. 123f. Thoreau traveled from Concord to the Fire Island shipwreck and came upon a body, but could not positively identify it as hers. In his *Journal*, Oct. 31,1850, he records that beach encounter and later inserts it with slight changes, in *Cape Cod*. See below, § 2, the passage ending with note 28, where he reports his inability to identify the body.

the sacred.\(^4\) If not in the style of Cartesian arguments, Thoreau gives us recognizable philosophical writing nevertheless, heard now as the voice of Aurelius, now as reminiscent of Nietzsche, Rousseau or the German Romantics.\(^5\) But all this waits to be shown. Starting with Thoreau in stride with Nietzsche’s Dionysian wild, I end with Thoreau in stride with Kierkegaard’s philosophical and religious explorations. The upshot is that just as Emerson should be read with Kant and Nietzsche, so should Thoreau be read alongside his forebears, say Aurelius or Socrates, or alongside his continental contemporaries, say Kierkegaard or Nietzsche.

\section*{§ 1 TRAGEDY AND DIONYSIAN RELIGION}

In the first instance, tragedy is not a theatrical performance or literary genre, still less a philosophical theory of the human condition. It is a condition of terrible suffering. A person or persons are at the center of affliction, which spreads out in waves to afflict others who witness. Tragedy on stage feeds on our knowledge of off-stage tragedy, and gives us a culturally shared scenario of life at the limit. It is a condition suffered viscerally, pressing the senses to the point of radical incapacity. We are struck dumb, blinded. The world is present with intensity so explosive that it simultaneously verges on total blackout, loss of self and world. We are not ourselves but become the very pain of our affliction.

Oedipus rips out his eyes because he cannot bear what he has seen, but it is also true that there is no more left to see, given pain’s saturation of his bodily consciousness. His world is his suffering, and he doesn’t need eyes to know that. He remains the intense living site of pain’s demonic power even while his suffering wipes out any other world. Yet Oedipus and Hamlet and Lear are not utterly stripped of

\(^4\) In “Silence and the Night” (unpublished), Lyman Mower discusses the contention of Levinas that although tragic drama can succeed in bringing suffering to a partial relief through catharsis, there is raw suffering from which there is no release, escape, or mitigation through art or any other means: pointless, useless, insufferable. He calls this ‘the tragic’. See Time and The Other, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, 1987, p 73. Thoreau starts his Journal, noting the trouble (if not outright suffering) of always recurring human need, his need, “to escape myself”, Oct 22, 1837.

\(^5\) Both Thoreau and Levinas can be seen to endorse “ethics as first philosophy”, the idea of a call or demand or “appearance” (‘ethics’) that exceeds our most heroic metaphysical reach. Alfred I. Tauber begins this discussion in Henry David Thoreau and the Moral Agency of Knowing, University of California Press, 2001; he acknowledges an encompassing debt to Levinas, p. xi and p. 231. See also Diane Perpich, The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, Stanford University Press, 2008, especially Chapter 5, “Scarce Resources? Levinas, Animals, and the Environment”.

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speech, mad though that speech may become. Tragic suffering in these cases occasions eloquent lament. In a resisting enactment of expressive powers we hear dignity played out in circumstances that undermine it. “The need for dignity arises”, Fred Beiser writes, “when tragic circumstances put a strain on our human nature, on the normal human constitution.” To achieve tragic dignity is to become more than a defeated victim of harsh fate. As Nietzsche has it in The Birth of Tragedy, to attain tragic dignity is to defeat the so-called wisdom of Silenus: better to die early, best never to have been born. Whatever tragedy Oedipus or Hamlet endures, and whatever tragic circumstance Thoreau endures, a measure of dignity can supervene – at the least, through the eloquence of writing. Thoreau will embrace what Nietzsche identifies as the inversion of Silenus, the heroic wisdom of Achilles: better to live long, but best never to die. Thoreau enacts that wisdom in writing, and also in walking, building, or speaking. Each enactment is a fundamental way of sustaining affinity with our landscape and place and with other of its inhabitants, modulated by ever-more perceptive senses, and by a range of vibrant sensibilities.

Nietzsche sees the roots of tragic drama in Dionysian religious rites that enact great suffering and sacrifice. A performance of sacrificial violence preempts or forestalls annihilation by giving affliction a ceremonial voice. Recurrent enactments become a celebration not only of cycles of death but of connected cycles of rebirth. Participants survive to enact lives and deaths once more and again, accompanied by music, dance, and intoxication. Dionysus is ripped apart and then reborn. Celebrants undergo cruelty and its metamorphosis in eloquent rebirth. Nietzschean invocations of Dionysus can model the sort of suffering and survival Thoreau writes out.

Through the eloquence of words and walking, Thoreau enacts the ephemerality of pain and its transformations as death yields to life and life yields to death. In the swamp outside Concord in what he

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6 Frederick Beiser, “Schiller as Philosopher: A Reply to my Critics” Inquiry. Vol. 51, No 1, Feb 2008, p. 69. “The personal suffering or sacrifice involved in performing some moral actions is the result of tragic circumstances as much as the weakness of human nature. Gods, angels, or titans, which have much more robust constitutions, could do all their duties with grace simply because they are never prone to suffering. Dignity indeed arises because of the great weakness of human nature; but that weakness reveals itself only under tragic circumstances.” Of course not all suffering is tragic suffering. Suffering through a difficult exam is hardly tragic.


8 Birth, p. 28
calls a hell before the coming war, he smells paradise in a lily.\(^9\) There is inescapable hell to undergo, even Dionysian dismemberment, which was Margaret Fuller’s fate. This young and greatly gifted philosophical-literary companion of Emerson and Thoreau drowned in shark-filled waters off Long Island, returning by sea from the Italian Revolution. Thoreau was sent to the Fire Island beach to find in the wreckage the body and what might remain of her personal effects. Yet in the pages of the *Journal* that finally make their way into *Cape Cod*, Thoreau can bring wonder and majesty to that desolate site.\(^10\)
If there is inescapable affliction, there is also metamorphosis. Dismemberments lurk without attaining *enduring* or *unmitigated* dominance.\(^11\)

As Nietzsche sees it, tragic theater grows out of Dionysian rites. In early theater, a tragic hero emerges who suffers yet eloquently *resists*. The Dionysian wildness at the archaic heart of tragic drama is wiped out, as Nietzsche sees it, with the triumph of rationality, ascetic intellectualism, and a rage for order. Athenian Platonism (or as he would call it, Socratic religiousness) is a stance that denies death *and* life. Nietzsche valorizes wildness as a necessary counterforce to more orderly Apollonian aspects of life and art. Both Thoreau and Nietzsche disavow any mere theoretical *onlooking* that sunders a person from immersion in the senses and in embodied life.

The Dionysian sets a context for Thoreau’s affirmation of a many-faceted wildness that engenders and preserves the world. Other aspects of the wild, each pulling in a slightly different direction, are linked to the tragic or Dionysian. For instance, there is Thoreau’s sense of the woodland or forest wild celebrated by present-day conservationists.\(^12\) There is also wildness in all life in its strivings and declines, of trees and insects as well as of salmon and hawks, a bio-centric view of creation. There is the alien, forbidding, even horrific wild that Thoreau finds atop Mt. Ktaadn as well as the lethal wild that

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\(^11\) On the possibility that some tragic moments are beyond redemption, see note 4, above.

\(^12\) “In wildness is the preservation of the world”, the environmentalist banner, comes from “Walking”, *Essays*, 162: “The West of which I speak is but another name for the Wild, and what I have been preparing to say is, that in Wildness is the preservation of the World. Every tree sends its fibers forth in search of the Wild. The cities import it at any price. Men plow and sail for it. From the forest and wilderness come the tonics and barks which brace mankind.” Note that ‘the wild’ is something cities import and tree roots seek.
wipes out Margaret Fuller, Emerson’s young son, and Thoreau’s older brother. Each of these contrasting facets of ‘the’ wild can be threaded through the primal-theme of a Dionysian wild.

“The Dionysian” is not a Thoreauvian term of art, though it weaves unnamed throughout his work. Take his intoxicated pursuits through woods and mountains, his wild desire to devour a woodchuck in his path, his joy in tasting fermented and wild frozen apples, his rebellion against Apollonian stasis in business-as-usual Concord, his tracking cycles of death and rebirth in plants and all life (a Dionysian centerpiece), his affinity for the wildness of John Brown (who, on Thoreau’s rendering, dies and becomes immortal), his sense of impending apocalyptic destruction, laid out at the biblical close of his essay “Wild Apples” – not to mention his thoughts on music: “there is something in a strain of music [which] reminds me of the cries emitted by wild beasts”. And “It is the wild thinking in Hamlet . . . that delights us”. In A Week on the Concord he alludes to archaic Corybantic rites. Only half tongue-in-cheek, in “Walking”, Thoreau says he might prefer that life be “a divine tragedy” rather than “this trivial comedy or farce”. And his treasured fields become “a Dismal Swamp”. There is a recurrent Dionysian sensibility breathing beneath the deceptive quiets of Walden Pond and daily pastoral saunters.

Even in writing Walden, Thoreau acknowledges what Nietzsche would recognize as the haunting presence of the Dionysian (not just the measured and serene Apollonian).

[I] find an instinct toward a higher . . . life and another toward a primitive rank and savage one, and I reverence them both. I love the wild not less than the good.

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15 “Walking”, Essays, p. 166; also Journals, Nov 16, 1850, 3rd paragraph.
16 See Week, p. 337. The Corybantes were children of Apollo and Thalia (the rustic muse of comedy). Revelers enacted deaths and rebirths through non-linguistic vehicles not unlike the walking, tasting, beholding, and climbing that we find in Thoreau.
18 Ibid. p. 164.
19 Walden, ‘Higher Laws’, opening paragraph. Within the opening pages we are given the wildly comic picture of Thoreau wanting to devour a woodchuck, to ingest wildness itself, as if incorporating wild flesh makes one even more wild. Eating the
The fires of the tragic feed the prophetic outrage of his political essays and burn slowly even under the more meditative tone of his *Week on the Concord*. We should not overlook, in this account of a trip with his brother, the sobering, even silencing, presence of another wild story of the river from a century and a half earlier, inserted quite unexpectedly. It is the story of Hannah Duston’s escape down the Merrimack after her capture in an Indian raid in 1697. Her still-nursing child was ripped from her arms and savagely killed. Later she killed and scalped her captors (and their children) in their sleep, carrying her bloody trophies downstream in their canoe. This is far from classical Apollonian orderliness (or Christian Paradise, or the New World “City on a Hill”).

Plato says philosophy is a rehearsal for death. John’s death, suffered at close quarters, was unhearsed. Thoreau was invaded three days later as death hollowed him out and took up residence. Thoreau took on all of John’s dying symptoms. Philosophy, nestled in the narrative of *A Week*, became a kind of retrospective accounting of his love for his brother, his ‘friendship’ (though that’s too weak a word) with John, disrupted by death, and became an accounting with the violent story of Hannah Duston. He had translated the violence in Aeschylus and Homer. He would later be eviscerated high on Mt. Ktaadn. Through the mist he sees the top to be the workshop of indifferent Gods. He feels his wild also (or alternatively) might tame or deflect it. Further on in “Higher Laws”, the wild seems less reverenced, and the Apollonian (‘higher’), more. Thoreau plays out both instincts, neither one unmoving the other. He tilts *Walden* toward the Apollonian and “Wild Apples” or “Ktaadn” (for instance), toward the Dionysian. Nietzsche has tragic drama require the reign of both divinities.

20 John Winthrop's 1630 sermon to New Englanders warned them that the world was watching their experiment in holiness, citing Matthew 5:14: "You are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hidden." See “A Modell of Christian Charity,” Robert C. Winthrop, *Life and Letters of John Winthrop*, p. 19 (1867).

21 *Phaedo*, 64a-c. Plato also lets Socrates say, in this context, that he has had a recurrent dream wherein a voice that instructs him to “make music and compose” — as J. Hillis Miller translates, “O Socrates, make music and work at it.” *Phaedo*, 60e. See J. Hillis Miller, *Theory Now and Then*, Duke University Press, 1991, p. 117.

22 On John Thoreau’s death, see *Henry Thoreau: A Life of the Mind*, Robert D. Richardson Jr., University of California Press, 1986, p. 113f., and Wai Chee Dimock’s brilliant account of the “symbiosis” between brothers through which Henry took on John’s bodily symptoms: “Global Civil Society: Thoreau on Three Continents” in *Through Other Continents*, Princeton, 2006, Chapt 1. The somatic-psychic border is porous within any single person, but also between persons and across time. Henry’s body is porous to John’s and Henry’s psychic borders are porous enough to receive the *Gita*, allowing it to link humankind globally and through time. Her account of the “travel” of the *Gita* on death, life, and violence from the deep past to Thoreau to Gandhi to King (and endless others) inspires my essay “Thoreau’s Translations”. I am grateful for the provocation of her essay, and to Clark West for passing it on. For the transmutation of Duston’s escape into a myth or parable of American Fall from Innocence, see Linck C. Johnson’s invaluable *Thoreau’s Complex Weave: The Writing of A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, University of Virginia Press, 1986, Ch. 4, pp. 122-62. On Thoreau’s use of the *Gita*, see Paul Friedrich, *The Gita Within Walden*, SUNY Press, 2009.

spirit fly outward from a crack between his ribs. But this Ktaadn-based anxious death and recovery was a minor skirmish next to John’s dying.

Death’s insistence calls us to life and to moods that are counter to death: joy and exaltation (among others). Philosophy can be a preparation by recuperating a sense of place and aliveness as a counter-weight to devastation.24 It is an arc rising from sadness and grief to lamentation and on toward ever-stronger affirmations in (and of) an anomalous, wonder-saturated world. Thoreau presents a wry and exuberant resistance lived out in walking, moving up river, skating, tasting fermented cold apples, writing through and over all of these. His walk into life reanimates the movement of limbs and the movement of pencil over and through his Journal. It is a crescendo toward acknowledgment of a Dionysian, musical pulse of life and death, of a god of disorder, drunkenness, and night.

Searching for Fuller’s personal effects, Thoreau returned to Concord having found nothing but scraps of clothing. Bones in the sand, never precisely defined as hers, were still on his mind days later when he reports a “lurid” “blood-stained” sky. Not insignificantly, he also called that sunset “glorious”.25 Writing a monument to Fuller’s majesty was, as we will see, an imaginative achievement. From the middle of Dionysian wildness, he preserves and redeems the song of Achilles: better to live long; best never to die.

Thoreau needs to find the knit of things against threats of unraveling. Writing through and over wilderness and death let him face unraveling while knitting composure. A Week on the Concord is a liturgical week, starting on Saturday, the day Christ enters the underworld to rescue the dead.26 Thoreau’s holy Saturday would bring John up from the dead. He would be more than a corpse or a body in death’s spasm.

24 We could say that philosophy’s concern is to raise from the dead what is best (the ‘friend’ evoked in a Week, the Fuller who reigns over the beach). We have no need to redeem what is better split off as decaying flesh, and every reason to raise what can be retained as the love or smile or power of the dead. To distinguish what is best left buried and what is worthy lifting up from the grave is the accomplishment of wise perception. The raising of the dead is an achievement of perception and of wise and eloquent words.


26 Holy Saturday commemorates the Harrowing of Hades, Christ’s descent into Hell to raise those deserving better. Clark West suggests this possibility. I thank him for countless insights into the religious dimension of Thoreau’s writing.
§ 2 REDEMTIVE WRITING AND READING

A glimpse of heaven is occasion for deep joy at just being alive. It is a renewable redemption from otherwise dark desperation. Thoreau’s words of gratitude and attentive praise, his hymning and love of the world, leave desperate circumstance tactfully aside -- or nearly aside -- or on the best days, and when possible . . . aside.\textsuperscript{27} As he glides across the frozen pond in pursuit of a scampering fox there’s no denying his lively delight. His exuberance places him in momentary heaven. We are redeemed from our darkest hours by joining his gliding pursuit. This is affirmative joy, but it does not just spring spontaneously from the brute luck of a cheerful disposition. He cultivates a capacity to spot that scampering fox, and glide smoothly as it curves through snow. And consider, at a different level of perception and response, Thoreau capacity to redeem his friend, Margaret Fuller.

Here he is -- along a bleak strip of beach off Long Island’s Atlantic shore, some miles from Manhattan. A distant splinter marks the place he hopes holds Margaret Fuller’s bones. This must be a place of grief. Yet as Thoreau approaches he sees the inconsiderable stick become a ship’s spar; and then become a rugged cairn, a monument holding the place of her reign and majesty.

Once . . . it was my business to go in search of the relics of a human body, mangled by sharks, which had just been cast up, a week after a wreck . . . . I expected that I must look very narrowly to find so small an object, but the sandy beach . . . was so perfectly smooth and bare . . . that when I was half a mile distant the insignificant sliver which marked the spot looked like a bleached spar, and the relics were as conspicuous as if they lay in state on that sandy plain, or a generation had labored to pile up their cairn there . . . they were singularly inoffensive both to the senses and

the imagination. . . That dead body had taken possession of the shore, and reigned over it as no living one could, in the name of a certain majesty that belonged to it.28

This passage is imported from Thoreau’s Journal (October 31, 1850). It was written three months after he returned from Fire Island, having traveled down from Concord on hearing of the shipwreck and that Fuller had perished. There he found spectators, scavengers, and those looking for friends or relatives. He learned of an unidentified body given a shallow burial five miles up the beach, marked by a stick. Arriving, the body was too decomposed to identify. Thoreau wrote to Charles Sumner that there was such decomposition that his “poor knowledge of anatomy” left him not knowing if it were male or female.29

A spar displaces a stick, and a cairn displaces a spar. The wide sweep of the shore displaces any offense the remains might have held. The scene is one of metamorphosis in an anomalous world, a world that doesn’t hold still. And the place of Fuller’s reign becomes the place of her communion with endless surf that brings her a kind of immortality. It is a rapport that leaves him out: he is this side of death.

Thoreau lets the site be illuminated, “clarified” in his writing, lets it assume its rightful majesty. It is as if the Journal or Cape Cod accounts show what might have been his discovery of Fuller’s bones. Kierkegaard calls this sort of metamorphosis the transfiguration of experience: “All poetry is life’s glorification (i.e. transfiguration) through its clarification (through being clarified, illuminated, ‘unfolded’, etc.)”.30

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28 Cape Cod, p. 123.
29 Lacking a body, no grave was ever erected for Fuller or her husband. Their son’s body was found. I thank Steve Webb for detective work.
[The] bones were alone with the beach and the sea, whose hollow roar seemed to address them . . . as if there were an understanding between them and the ocean which necessarily left me out.  

Strips of flesh yield to rolling communion with the sea. Blinding sorrow is deflected by somber exaltation.

Poetry and philosophy can deflect the cruelest of realities without becoming only illicit cover-up or avoidance of truth. Recapitulation of experience in a mode that deflects can be a healthy defense -- say as we deflect a blow aimed at the head. It allows us to live and move on. Similarly, sublimation is not always a refusal to face up to difficult reality. Thoreau’s art deflects or sublimates, not as denial of trouble or affliction, but as activity that transfigures it in the service of restoring and redeeming life. He writes to redeem tragic conditions in his “Plea for John Brown” -- we witness an achievement of immortality for Brown. He works to redeem Brown or Fuller and toward his own redemption from the unutterable hurt of John’s death, of the death of Emerson’s young son, of the hell of an approaching civil war. He redeems readers, passing them the sense that his transforming resistance can be theirs.

The wisdom of Achilles, best never to die, is a counter-weight to the dismal adage of Silenus, best never to have been born. Thoreau’s redemptive writing effects a shift from Silenus to Achilles as he faces the dismal evidence of Fuller’s and young Emerson’s and his brother’s death. In “Slavery in Massachusetts,” he sees hell along his meadows and water-ways with increasing violent clashes over slavery and the dark approach of war. Yet walking the edge of a malodorous swamp, a fresh-smelling lily appears, a promise of purity, hope, and heaven that offsets political stench.

There are also moments of heaven in A Week. Having slept the night at the top of Mt. Greylock in the make-do comfort of a ramshackle coffin, he awakens to look across three states, surveying a

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31 Cape Cod, p. 123.
33 See “Thoreau’s Translations”.
heavenly expanse of good earth. Returning to the Merrimack, old hell obtrudes. The now and again turbulent river that Henry and John take upward toward New Hampshire’s White Mountains is the river that carried a desperate Hannah Duston back down by canoe with scalps, to her burned out home in Haverhill, her slaughtered infant fresh in mind. Thoreau links the upstream journey toward a source of light and life-giving waters to the downstream memory of a bitter fall for humankind in the cameo of Duston’s capture, forced march, retaliatory slaughter, and downriver escape. Some years after the recapture of Anthony Burns in Boston in 1856, Thoreau laments that his usual sojourns in meadows are bringing no relief. “I cannot persuade myself”, he writes, “that I do not live wholly within Hell.” Then a lily brings paradise.

§ 3 SENSING HEAVEN IN HELL

Thoreau elicits imagined yet not unreal moments of the best, forestalling inundations of the worst. He boils this down to the aspiration for principled action and for an increase of fragrance in the land -- delivered by lilies, for instance. In a mock-Kantian twist, he gives us his categorical imperative: “So behave that the odor of your actions may enhance the general sweetness of the atmosphere . . .” A phoebe darts against the fragrance of a meadow, moist earth slippers our feet. These saving perceptions can be turned over in hindsight and memory, playing a crucial role in the refinement of perception, and in expanding our capacity to meet more fragrant worlds. Reflective memory is the space where Thoreau’s Journals take shape, where his perceptions mature in a fertile marinate of imagination. Perception is philia, a companionable relation, an affinity and affiliation, an ongoing dance-like duet of perceiver and perceived, in process, achieved and at risk, moving always, despite hell and its stench, for a glimpse of heaven, even as a harvest moon glimpses us.

34 Week, p. 186-88.  
35 Joel Porte sees the upriver trip as a search for “the source of the Concord and Merrimack rivers”, and the source “of all seas and mountains, indeed of primal daylight.” Consciousness and Culture: Emerson and Thoreau Reviewed, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 131. But Porte does not connect this upstream journey to the downstream memory of tragic fall.  
37 Ibid. Italics mine. This mimics Kant’s moral imperative, “So act that the maxim of your action can be made universal law.”
Heaven can appear as the wildness of a woodlot calling for attentive praise in poetry or prose. The wildness of fermented apples, nectar of the gods, greet us, calling for tribute. There is the more global heavenly wildness of all life — from leaves and flowing sands\(^{38}\) to the life of rivers and soaring hawks. To say these are creation and heaven-like is to picture them unfolding under something like the glance of a divinity — as if a fine creator were appreciating the passing wonder of her work, always underway. Such an image underwrites a confidence that here a glimpse of heaven is achieved (when it is).

And there are less salutary wilds to tally, closer to hell than to heaven. There are the often wrenching lives and deaths of ordinary folk, and a terrifyingly cruel wild so vivid in the deaths of Fuller or Brown, in the heartless blotting out of Thoreau’s brother, John, or of Emerson’s son, or in the loss of American Paradise haunting the capture and flight of Hannah Duston. As woodland wilds become heartening, lethal wilds are accordingly muted; and when the focus is death and dismemberment, woodland wilds lose salience. Yet again, there is a contrasting register, neither explicitly lethal nor warmly reassuring, the indifferent and vaguely hostile wild atop Mt. Ktaadn. As the time of woodland wilds arises to hearten, lethal wilds retreat, ever-more discretely muted; as the time of wildly cruel death and dismemberment obtrudes, the time of nurturing woodland wilds is for the moment lost. The wild of Walden wanes as the menacing wild of Ktaadn intervenes. The indifference of mere habit and narrow technical or bureaucratic efficiency diminish all wilds, whether gentle or horrific.

At the more desolate reaches of the wild, Thoreau shows us eloquent resistance carrying aspirations of redemption. The very sea that kills Fuller sings to her undying spirit. Perceptual metamorphoses deliver such saving moments. Eyes see the spar and the cairn that memorialize Fuller, and ears overhear her whispered communion with the sea. Writing raises the dead through effecting sensory transformations, while the world delivers an ever-changing range of prompts fit for a modulation toward lyric perception. This ongoing three-way exchange — incoming sources, perceiving, and writing -- never leaves senses behind. Writing modifies senses, and writing is informed by perceptions that are fed

\(^{38}\) For Thoreau there is life even in flowing sand. He works out this perception of living sand over visits and revisits to a sand bank, cut to make way for a rail bed. The “sandcut” is described in Walden, “Spring”.

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by sensory sources and writing. Thoreau declares near the end of A Week, “We need pray for no higher heaven than the pure senses can furnish . . .”

A sentimentalist could believe that senses can furnish a heaven, but even the rigorous Kant succumbs. As his friend Wasianski reports:

[Kant’s] face radiated [a] kind of grave charm when he told with intense delight how he had once held a Swallow in his hands, peered into its eyes, and felt as though he had looked into heaven.

In a strange parallel, Thoreau imagines himself looking through the eye of a bittern, a bird contemplating water, who “may have wrested the whole of her secret from Nature.” Despite her veils and secrets, Thoreau would know Nature through a liquid eye attentive to waters. In A Week, Thoreau asks wistfully and not altogether hopelessly “Might I not see God?”

For Kant, mind is not an empiricist’s passive, empty basket where impressions arrive for inspection or sorting or joining. It is more like a construction or processing site where experience and

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39 Week, p. 382, Italics mine.
40 Wasianski: Kant’s Last Years, quoted in W.R. Washington Sullivan, Morality as a Religion, BiblioBazaar 2007 [orig. 1898], p. 50.
41 Week pp. 235-6. Joel Porte notes this passage, and relates it to Bachelard’s discussions of Thales (water) and Heraclitus (a hearth’s fire) in Consciousness in Concord, p. 132. Among 20th century Parisian philosophers, Gaston Bachelard was a great reader of Thoreau, as is Pierre Hadot.
42 Week, p. 382.
43 A group of Concord intellectuals became “transcendentalists” in tribute to what they knew of Kant’s “transcendental philosophy”. “Transcendentalists” was an adopted identity for Emerson, Fuller, and others -- but it meant many things. When Thoreau calls John Brown a “true transcendentalist” he means a man who lives high ideals, someone who transcends moral mediocrity. On the other hand, “The transcendental club” of Boston accepted the moniker because they saw themselves as following the “transcendental” spirit of German Philosophy -- Kant, but also his romantic and idealistic successors. Frederick Hedge returned from Germany fired up about Kant, Herder, Fichte, Schiller, Kant, Coleridge and others who offered a lofty moral philosophy that put emphasis, in Kant’s phrase, on “coming into one’s maturity” through critical reason that would undermine illiberal, authoritarian and clerical conservatism. Allied with imagination, reason could provide intuitions about the role of regulative ideals like Morality and Freedom. Many transcendentalists were Ex-Unitarian Ministers who endorsed the new biblical criticism from Germany. The “search for the historical Jesus” discovered Jesus to be a near-perfect and fully human moral exemplar. How much emphasis the transcendentalists (or Thoreau) put on Kant’s epistemology (as opposed to his moral philosophy) is uncertain. The “productive imagination” -- an anti-Lockean idea of an active, world-shaping mind, sometimes linked to the idea of genius -- would be of more interest than the bare bones empiricism of Locke or Hume. Kant denied access to “the thing-in-itself”. Decoupled from accountability to “the thing-in-itself”, imagination and poetry were set free (or so one could argue). See Phillip Gura, American Transcendentalism, a History. Hill and Wang, 2007. Thoreau makes a claim that seems to transcend Kant’s First Critique position: “The boundaries of the actual are no more fixed and rigid than the elasticity of our
judgments are shaped or produced. Kant asks what the mind must be like if the world is as it seems. Thoreau asks what the world can be. Can it be better -- if we but see and hear it (despite its horrors) in more of its wonders? Kant asks what makes ordinary perception of ships or spoons possible. Thoreau asks why perceptions sink so easily toward the dull and deadening. Kant wants to explain perceptions and experience while Thoreau wants to expand the range and depth of our experience and perception – the depth of evils, but also of heavens. He wants to reform waning capacities for tasting apples that the gods savor, for scenting heaven in lilies, for sounding ponds that can hardly be fathomed. We have hardly begun even to desire to perceive.

Kant can only hope to see heaven in the eye of a swallow. The official system of his First Critique does not allow glimpses of heaven. The Third Critique might do better. The theme of the sublime and the positing of aesthetic ideas can expand imagination to a world beyond the pale object-hood of ships or spoons. Aesthetic ideas include love, envy, fame, death, and vice. If these open toward the sublime, in dramas of yearning, beholding, and despair, we might imagine them also open toward a glimpse of heaven in the eye of a sparrow, and a glimpse of Hades in death’s eye; a glimpse of love in the eye of a friend, a glimpse of vice in the cold visage of a southern slave-catcher. In any case, in the First Critique Kant does not linger with the role of affect, desire, or mood as affording access to the beauty or vice, the terrors or redemptions of our worlds. Nor does he linger to consider educating senses and imagination, as these afford access to better attunements to worlds perceived, and to better capacities to

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*imagination*” (J. V, 203). But it may not transcend Kant’s Third Critique position. Thoreau might mean (Kant aside) that the elastic imagination stretches our apprehension of ‘the actual’, allowing it to achieve new form – for ‘the actual’ is not fixed through time, but changes with it. This can be interpreted along the lines of Cavell’s moral perfectionism, first voiced in *The Senses of Walden*, (Viking, 1972), and continued in a number of later writings, including *Cities of Words, Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life* (Harvard: 2005). Imagination might let us become the actual persons we can be -- let the actual, perhaps, be as elastic as the imagination. We find a person and writer continually transcending their latest version of their worlds and the selves they can be. It is imagination that reveals that we are not ‘beyond reproach’, morally, and thus that there is always an improved self to make actual. Our imagination thus expands the bounds of the actual. Thoreau took philosophy to be as unfinished and non-systematic as the self, and devoted to the care of the unfinished self. One enlists imagination in the effort to bring the best to light, and so partakes in the transfiguration at least of the soul and even of social life. Thoreau’s imagination takes him to Concord’s jail; his transfiguring experience, traveling to Gandhi and King, remakes the world.

44 For discussion, see J. M. Bernstein, *The Fate of Art*, Penn State Press, 1992, p. 96.

45 See “Thoreau’s Translations: John Brown, Apples, Lilies”.
voice our worlds, and to voice who we are in them.\footnote{For an account of the education of the senses and perception in the never-ending achievements of moral sensibility, see Sabina Lovibond, \textit{Ethical Formation}, Harvard University Press, 2002.} In the \textit{First Critique}, Kant pauses in a famous moment, to bask in awe under starry heavens. But this is an uncharacteristic break in an otherwise puritanical focus on justification and works.

\section*{§ 4 Achieving Perception and Affinity}

Thoreau does not give us an explicit theory of perception, but it is clear that he would have rejected both the classical empiricist model of mind (a receptacle for impressions) and the Kantian model (a bustling multi-storied processing plant). Thoreau gives us a variety of perceptual attunements to the world across an expansive range of possibilities, and notes our recalcitrant distance from those attunements that otherwise could be redeeming. The implicit lesson of his examples, as I read him, roughly follows the lines of a Stoic model of perception. To perceive well is to attain a learned affinity with one’s embodied action with others in a surrounding habitat and inherited milieu. One learns adjustments -- culturally, if one is a cultural animal -- that attune one naturally to one’s needs, desires, physicality, sociality, place, family, and history.

\textit{Oikeiosis} is the Stoic term of art for the acquired fit between a fox and its world, for instance its capacity to bound naturally through snow; for the acquired fit between a bird and its capacity to find non-poisonous berries, or between a duck and its awareness of its speed, wing alignment, motion, and the look of the pond as it descends in an easy water landing that gracefully confirms its fit to its world. This perceptual fit of creature to itself and world is “\textit{Oikeiosis}”, a word that might translate as attunement, affiliation or affinity. As a network of such protective and nourishing affinities, the term is sometimes rendered in modern parlance as ‘economy.’\footnote{See Wayne M. Martin, “Conscience and Confession in Rousseau’s Naturalistic Moral Psychology,” available at privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~wmartin/MartinRousseauPaper.pdf.} We can speak of an ongoing perceptual economy of connectedness, or more poetically of an unfolding dance of the senses with others, with oneself, with things, with remembered previous perceptions, with anticipations of our next perceptions. We assume this
connectedness as a matter of course in the animal and vegetable world. For human animals, even when smooth affiliation or connectedness is admitted as a goal, achieving it is often nothing if not excruciatingly difficult. (On the other hand, however, in the usual routines of life it can be so easy we hardly notice – getting dressed, getting through a pleasant workday, attending to business).

When perceptual affinities are lost or damaged, we are misfits to ourselves and our milieu and to others. We undergo estrangement, disenchantment, objectification; we suffer a despairing loss of meaning. How can we picture, not the failure of fit, but successful fit-to-world?

My touch on your shoulder (as we move into a turn) gives a perception to you. But your shoulder touches me as I touch you. That shoulder delivers a perception back to me in the instant I deliver one to you. Our successful attunement rests on a mutual fittingness of perceptions exchanged. We learn of the aptness of fit from response of the other. Perhaps your flinch tells me my perceptual delivery has misfired. I learn thereafter to better modulate my tactile communication. My perception of you is modulated by your perception of me, as you return a responsive perception to me (a kind of flinching, or a kind of gentle yielding). Such is our dance-like access to the world, and the world’s dance-like access of us. Thoreau imagines the roar of the sea addressing Margaret Fuller, calling to her scoured bones, establishing a communion -- her ear (as it were), alert to the endless whisper of waves. Thoreau addresses us, gives us a concatenation of perceptions and words that are the moving communion between Fuller and the sea that seems to exclude him. We receive (or reject) his perception of intimacy between bones and sea, and his sense of exclusion. We flinch or are warmed by the perceptions delivered.

The world and others advance and recede, and our receptive capacities are ever in growth and decline. We can hear better (or worse), feel more (or less) of the subtlety afoot in a touch delivered. A sound has a pitch, extension, and rhythm not immediately evident. A look has a density. How much do

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An echo endorses perceptual affinity as a call into nature is returned in kind. Thoreau writes “Of what significance is any sound if Nature does not echo it”; and “woodland lungs . . . seemed particularly sound to day”, seeming “to mouth” the answer they give. Journals, after October 31, 1850, 7 pages in, Princeton edition, p. 129.
we sense it? The press of a hand has insistence or gentleness. Narratives emerge as my touch meets your shoulder, and your shoulder touches back, this way or that. The dance of mutual perceptions can weave into ever-expanding narratives of approach and avoidance, lordship and bondage, embrace and exile, love of the world and suffering its refusals.

Thoreau works to modulate touch, better to receive the subtleties of the world. The touch of the eye elicits response. With the sight of a bounding fox, Thoreau bounds in response. Under a silent sky he’s patient with silence. As whippoorwills whistle from across the lake, he sings back. Seldom if ever does sensory input arrive completely unfit for a dance, inert like an accidental shop-window manikin, strewn with dust, unsmiling, not scowling, not even dressed. Things of the world and their absence greet us, surprise or annoy us, pique our curiosity or raise our ire, prompt a song or lament or a bounding, mimicking celebration. Learning to modulate our perceptions, attunements and responses is an ongoing, educational affair. It is learning to hear and see better, more aptly, catching the drift of promising affinities with ever more subtle attention to all that impinges.

*Philia* begins as a register of *Oikeiosis*, as part of our elemental perceptual fit-to-world. It can be as evident as the moves of a dance-couple on ice, or the moves of a sloop tacking into the wind, hearing (and seeing) the flowing warnings and invitations of a breeze and a chop. Alternatively, this perceptual fit can be less dramatically displayed, and easily overlooked. I’m given the sense as I stride that a mild unevenness in the floor threatens to upset my poise, and calls for correction. The bump calls for an adjustment from me, that I effect effortlessly, thus restoring and maintaining filial exchange between my body and world. We are in stride (so much of the time) and don’t lose it. Through infancy and beyond, perceptual fit is continually refined as part of ongoing initiations into various aspects of physical and social life (an ability to balance in snow, an ability to apologize). Refinement in perception allows me to see burdens in my friend’s halting glance.

Interweaving mutually exchanged imagination-saturated perceptions over time makes possible all that I see in my friend’s glance. Our best perceptions are founded on kinship, on what Cavell calls love of
the world (and acknowledgment of others). This is not to say that such love won’t be crushed by the intrusion of evil or of indifference or of natural catastrophe, or by our own insufficiencies of heart. Thoreau has our best perceptions figured as achieved -- often something still yet to achieve, as our elemental natures develop ever toward more complex second natures. And perceptions initially his achievement can tilt our developing perceptions toward preservative, redeeming love (if we will).

With its own generous inspirations, the world meets Thoreau’s generously inspired pen. Margaret Fuller delivers majesty and Thoreau’s eye and pen receive and convey it. She is received as majestic in death, which, in Thoreau’s rendering of the beach, is a startling imaginative achievement. This is perception at risk, not guaranteed. It is not data-reception, but a dance full of stumbles and miscues and meaningless diversion -- while also full of wonder (and terror) and fulfillments. Philosophy can start and end there, in perceptual achievements and also with disappointments and struggles with miscues. As Thoreau has it, we are perennially tempted to digress and divert and insistently explicate or defend, which in crucial cases is to forego contact for the trappings of by-play. “Could we for a moment drop this by-play – and simply wonder – without reference or inference!”

§ 5 WONDER-WOUNDED HEARING

Thoreau’s genius is his perceptual range, depth, and acuity, fueled by an inventive and keen imagination that modulates his affinities to the world through sound, sight, touch, taste, smell, and sense of balance. The fulfillment of this genius rests on his success in passing on his perceptions to us, and on the expressiveness of a world that delivers all that is worth perceiving. The unfolding of the world is like a face-to-face encounter where meaning intervenes and flowers. Thoreau opens a hand to a world that


50 See Lovibond, Ethical Formation, on McDowell’s and Aristotle’s second nature.

51 Lyman Mower points out that here Thoreau expands the Heidegger of Being and Time: things can appear as instruments-in-use (‘at hand’), or as “mere occurrence” (‘to hand’, looked at with detachment), but also as things to enjoy, take delight in, or love. Journals, December 7th, 1838.
extends its hand to him. At its best a creative expression of self is completed, at least momentarily, in the
unfolding reality of an expressive world, and an expressive world is completed, at least momentarily, in
the dance of a self’s creative expressiveness, in perceptions and responses attuned to the expressiveness
and receptivity of the world.

Co-creation is the mutual implication of self and world. Thoreau is receptive to the movement
and whisper of wind and to the gaze of stars; in turn, he is polyphonically expressive in his address to
them. Each can be better or worse in attunement to the other. Blinding snow repels our walk and sight.
Fetid scatterings of flesh will repel a gaze and approach. A striking melody can fall on deaf ears. We
wonder if a finer attunement can be achieved, and applaud if it can. Not hearing the sea address the
shore, debris would win out. Wonder-raising prose depends on wonder-flowing worlds, and on what
Hamlet calls “wonder-wounded hearing.”

At its best the world has an erotic appeal addressed to our capacities for love. But eros, philia,
and preservative love are always a risk, and perceptual philia, a disposition toward perceptions that
provide a promise and yield of affiliation, is no exception. What lover walking the wreckage-strewn
beach would not want to avert her eyes at the spot where Fuller’s body is tossed and half-buried like old
lunch? The bones can’t be only discarded flesh. They must be what they can be, and they must be other
than trash. Thoreau tells us they can be, and are, a saint’s relics, nestled inoffensively in the sand. To see

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53 As the gap between perceiver and perceived closes -- as it does in Thoreau’s romp with a fox, or as I flow with your glide
across ice, or as, in a famous passage from Rousseau’s Reveries of a Solitary Walker, his second walk -- is there directionality of
impact? Rousseau recounts a moment of rebirth after having been felled by a racing Great Dane: “Night was beginning to fall. I
perceived the sky, some stars, and green leaves. This first sensation was a delicious moment. I was conscious of myself only
through this. I was being born into life in that instant, and it seemed to me as if all I perceived was filled with my frail existence.“
(my emphasis) Rousseau chooses the idiom of the perceiver flowing out, reaching out to the world. The perceiver envelopes the
perceived. But a gap closing might invoke an idiom that reverses initiative, the world (as it were) flowing in to flood the
perceiving self. Drenched by an onset of significance, the self disappears, leaving only the world. The directionality -- inside out
or outside in -- will disappear from a third perspective: seamlessness is an interconnectedness or synergy. The coldness of the
stream into which one plunges one’s hand becomes the coldness of the hand enveloped by a freezing stream. Coldness, hand, and
stream then become an experientially undifferentiated plenum. Just so, Rousseau perceives the tree even as he flows into it,
becoming its greenness; and the tree is there, entering his awareness and flooding out any Jean Jacques apart from its presence.
Some aspects of Emerson’s famous passage toward becoming a “transparent eyeball” – where he is what appears and what
appears is he – can be understood along similar lines. See Barbara Packer, Emerson’s Fall, Continuum, 1982, pp. 79-82.
54 Hamlet, III, i. Here, the stars themselves “stand as wonder-wounded hearers” before the wails of Laertes; but the irony is
that his wails would not catch the interest of a toad. Hamlet is sarcastic. When the stars do stand still in wonder, we know that
elocution stops everything on earth and in heaven dead in its tracks. I will call this “the dance of perception”.

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only their brokenness is to be false to the friend who walked with him in Concord before leaving to report on the Revolution in Rome. Thoreau’s cairn makes a place for her continuing life.

Thoreau responds to his friend’s catastrophe in the perceptual registers of friendship and love (mixed with grief). He responds to the catastrophe of slavery in the registers of integrity that is angered, outraged, and of justice -- that is absent, in shreds. In the case of less catastrophic troubles, say the need for shelter and the warmth of companionship, he would respond with simple hospitality.

In an underappreciated essay, perhaps best titled “The Inn Keeper”, Thoreau elaborates a post-structuralist and primal religious theme – unstinting welcome to the stranger and traveler. The Inn and its keeper offer a humane and convivial refuge and succor in answering the knock of all who travel from home, who list between homes, or are homeless. The Inn, its keeper, and his tavern answer pervasive estrangements. They are momentary answer to the sense of placeless unheimlichkeit. This is a vein we would do well to attend to today. This welcoming and generous host offers shelter to those of all faiths and walks of life.

Methinks I see the thousand shrines erected to Hospitality shining afar in all countries, as well Mahometan and Jewish, as Christian, khans, and caravansaries, and inns, wither all pilgrims without distinction resort.

His roof gathers in any who arrive to escape storms or the chill, giving haven to all to talk, eat, drink, share in good cheer. The tavern keeper also presides, if not over full Dionysian revelry, then over mild inebriation. (In “Wild Apples”, as the very ‘nectar of the gods’, Thoreau savors frozen but thawing and fermented apples.)

Of course, the needs of those caught in tragic ordeals or devastation exceed what simple hospitality can offer -- though hospitality must always be welcome. Margaret Fuller, Hannah Duston, John Thoreau, and John Brown need more, and other, than shelter and good cheer. In calamity we would call on our capacities for outrage and on our deep willingness to witness with their suffering, in a kind of

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philia or love. E. M. Forster’s “only connect” sounds against a world bent on destruction. Rick Furtak observes that when our connections with life are severed, “... it is as if an erotic bond has been broken.” But what is broken can often be mended, or made sufferable, and it is worth the try. Thoreau writes “There is no remedy for love but to love more.”

§ 6 THOREAU AND PHILOSOPHY

Thoreau gets shelved as literature, even when he’s writing as a naturalist or comparative religionist or angry prophet or explorer of those anomalous zones where the stench of the swamps meets the fragrance of the lily, or where life is intermixed with death, or death with life. Now those whose model of true philosophy is writing that provides sustained and explicit argumentation won’t quibble at this practice of shelving Thoreau with literature. And those whose model of religion is bound up with social institutions or denominations will want him shelved there, too -- not with books on (or of) religion. But why think books must have but a single shelf-identity?

Philosophers dedicated exclusively to disciplined argumentation may block out moments of silence, quiet, or waiting, or moments of a particular beauty or terror, that so often appear in Thoreau. Of course, these moments might be reconstructed as moves within a sub-textual argument, but it’s as likely that Thoreau and other ‘literary philosophers’ let their writing carry essentially non-argumentative impact. Often first on Thoreau’s agenda is what John Austin would call the perlocutionary force of speech or writing – writing that may state something, but as important, may be an instance of experiential evocation, or an instance of performative utterance, say promising. If Thoreau bursts out, “I wanted to devour the woodchuck on the spot!”, he might be asserting something about his desires, and also calling others to witness to an impulse they might have disowned or missed as their own, and be startled to find

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57 Journals, July 25, 1839.
in Thoreau. Wonders and startles have their time in philosophical writing, a time of their own quite other than being an occasion for a reader’s quick argumentative response. Wonder – and less commonly, its shadows, say terror or outrage—is woven seamlessly through Thoreau’s most detailed descriptions, through his most arching overviews, through his most sober critiques and his most explicit arguments.

His sentences give us what Stanley Cavell calls passionate utterance, words whose force and effect is a passionate intervention in “the disorders of desire”, in that site of conflicted impulses and fantasies and aspirations and despair that one could call the soul. A passionate utterance is “an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire.” Thoreau’s passionate, intimate words cannot effect or cause change willy-nilly, but they can appeal movingly to our need for change, to our yearning or only half-acknowledged readiness for it, to our sensitivity to the improvising poetry of his appeals. And perhaps we will respond in a way that shows we are changed, in small or bigger ways. This sort of intersubjective exchange and change of view and comportment is far from the business of offering and accepting (or rejecting or amending) well-crafted arguments.

Thoreau gives argument fragments, and in his political essays, he makes extended and powerful argumentative appeals. But like the writing of Aeschylus and Homer, whom he admires and translates, narrative is the stream that carries arguments along; they don’t have automatic pride of place. Socrates is irritated at the boys squabbling at his feet because they don’t grasp the larger aims and visions in whose service Socrates interrogates. For his students, philosophy means intellectual sword play, an amusing diversion, a by-play that deflects from a wondrous reality that needs to appear and sink in.

There is a way of writing philosophically, for instance in Montaigne or Aurelius, that doesn’t end in a clear cut

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58 For a defense of moral thinking as engaging imagination in a register quite other than moral judgment and forensic argumentation, see Alice Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment, Harvard University Press, 2007.
60 Writers can transform selves through enactments of convention and law, but also through intimate intervention in the lives and souls of readers. When I participate in conventions or activate formal procedures to effect a change in my world – say as I apologize and promise to return your tool now resting in my garage (participating in those practices), or as I vote to change the bylaws of my association (activating a formal procedure) -- my words and gestures have what philosophers of language would call “performative force.” The force of Thoreau’s writing has its effect at a more intimate level.
61 For Socrates as far more than a rigorous intellectual interrogator, see On Soren Kierkegaard, Chaps. 1-4.
propositional “therefore”. Perhaps it evokes an appropriate mood for thinking – thinking in a way appropriate to some slice of live. In any case, such writing stalls or sidesteps the impulse toward smart rejoinder or counter argument. This is because what’s being presented for philosophy, for wisdom or insight, is not a strikingly demonstrated conclusion, but wisdom or insight free and clear. What’s presented can be a stunning or gentle emergent philosophical wonder or image, an alluring vision or event. Thoreau gives us sentences that are philosophical showings – of delight and affliction, for instance. His sentences say and also reveal and evoke. They can reveal as they deflect the worst of suffering and brokenness and as they open toward what Cavell calls love of the world.62

Plato teaches by argument but also with drama, myth, parable, images, and Eros, making these essential to his task.63 Rousseau presents arguments in his prize essays, but he also gives us, in Reveries of a Solitary Walker, evocative settings and moods and flashes of insight.64 In his several Critiques, Kant gives us deductions but in his Essays he gives us his myth or parable of a part of creation: animal instincts are “that voice of God that all animals obey”.65 He gives no argument for this mysterious and unexpected claim. He knows that no argument could be given. Yet he is not just indulging a foolish whimsy. We get a specifically philosophical conceit, a moment of philosophical caprice and wonder. Creatures, he confides, have access to the voice of God. God accesses them, and they obey naturally, instinctually. So instinct is not a hard-wired mechanical response but a wonderful answering to a call (or command). Animals are attuned to the divine; the divine is attuned to animals.66

62 See Lost Intimacy, especially chs. 7, 11.
63 See Paul Friedlander’s neglected study, Plato, an Introduction, Princeton University Press, 1958, for Plato as a poet who wants his (philosophical) poetry to set the standard. In the final chapter of Cities of Words, Cavell suggests that Plato’s aim (in Republic) is not to banish all poetry but to let philosophical poetry show its claim to be heard and be better.
65 “Conjectures on the beginning of history”, Kant on History, ed. Louis White Beck, Bobbs Merrill, 1963, p. 55. One wonders how much of this picture to fill in imaginatively. I take it that instinctual responses of animals are expressions (for Kant) of obedience. Their actions voice compliance. If we extrapolated imaginatively, we might conclude that creatures who can hear the will of another and voice their obedience are also creatures that judge: the cat judges that she has to run faster to catch her prey, or judges that instead, she should rest in the shade.
66 In his third set of Discourses, 1849, Kierkegaard has the lilly and the bird obey the voice of God who asks them to be themselves; they respond ‘instinctually’, affirmatively. I thank Marcia Robinson for this resonance. 1849 is the year of Thoreau's first walk on Cape Cod and of his essay on resistance to civil government.
Here we have Kant figuring an animal’s place in creation in an emphatically non-Cartesian framework. (Cartesian animals are only machines.) And expanding his abbreviated figurative gesture, we could take an animal’s answer to heaven’s call or command as itself a form of speech – as when our comportment speaks. Hawks bespeak ease and power and grace in their flight. Instinct is the way animals voice an affinity with their settings, in multiform creation, and with the divine as the benign look that tells us that affinity has been made real. The eye of a sparrow, in its luminous glimmer bespeaks the eye of heaven, in its glory. This is co-creation, mutual resonance, the touch of divinity meeting the touch of a creature.

Of course logically speaking, these are loose, even flimsy, associations that demonstrate absolutely nothing. But Kant’s figuration of a part of creation can provoke poetic-philosophical wonder that I would not want to censor or suppress. And such poetic-philosophical wonder is a running and recurrent theme in Thoreau. We can also find it in more recent thinkers of some repute.

Wittgenstein announced without elaboration, “if a lion could speak we would not understand him”. This oracular pronouncement belongs with his picture of language at play within forms of life, an image meant to displace the picture of language as a deracinated propositional system. Wittgenstein assumes that we share too little life with a lion to understand him, were he to speak. His point, whatever its worth, is uttered with no explicit argument about animal speech (were it possible). We’re left with a picture, as if from a children’s book, of a speaking lion who can’t be understood. The image is meant to persuade largely on its own – and on our willingness to improvise stories, as if to a listening child, that might (or might not) give the image more resonance. If such a rapid picture-remark works, Wittgenstein will have left us in philosophical wonder (perhaps always lurked also by shadow and doubts). This wonder can be pursued after it has sunk in, but it’s clear that Wittgenstein is not offering a smart, doubt-stopping QED meant to cancel all further discussion. The remark is something like Kant’s figure of

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animals obedient to God. If we are annoyed by such images or story-fragments in philosophy’s sanctum, we will be left just plain exasperated: in Wittgenstein’s case, what in the world are lions doing there!

Provoked by his gnomic remark, I’d add a trailer: “If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t understand him much more than we already do!” This shift in the picture is a shift from a presumed lack of understanding across species to a plain (if partial) sufficiency of understanding. Thoreau can bound across snow with a fox because he understands it -- quite apart from speech. I understand my dog’s plea for a walk. We already understand the lion who (through instinct, as Kant would say) speaks, voices, gestures, roars: roars, “This turf is mine! Back off!” We bi-pedaled speaking-animals who read this page share ways of life with these felines, and so share understanding, in advance of what Wittgenstein conjures as a lion speaking and our failure to understand.  

Not unlike lions, we too protect our food and our cubs and occasionally bask in the sun. Some, like Thoreau, will bound after a fox. He enacts, thereby, mutual understanding across species.

Now if these evocations of a shared form of life across species seem the least bit plausible, I’ve accomplished something philosophical with barely a shred of argumentation (though parts could be recast rather woodenly as an argument). Philosophical insight, if it’s deepened at all, comes in this case, and in others like it, through little scenarios and fantasies and imaginative prods, meant to make a new aspect of things come to light. In writing like Thoreau’s, or in this snippet from Wittgenstein, insight, if it arrives, will not have been secured by making an elaborate case, say for our affinities with animal life that is backed up by the argument that animals have rights or minds, or that they can reason or suffer. Insight will arrive (if it does) in a glance of surprise or recognition.

These moments in Kant and Wittgenstein on animals (and my stab at amendments) illustrate a place for wonder (and its shadows) in philosophy. They mark a place for the unargued and perhaps the unarguable. They mark a place for the capacity of philosophy, beyond argument alone, to reorient our

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68 Perhaps lions don’t have an inaccessible life, in the sense of an “inner life” – a life they could report on if only they had speech. In any case, let me add that my amendment doesn’t entail that Wittgenstein has made a mistake. His claim is open-ended and provokes as much as declares. And that may be enough for his immediate purposes.

69 Philosophy and Animal Life is close at hand, and no doubt tilts my formulations.
perspectives and so let us see. Thoreau gives us the sort of pictorial and narrative philosophical vision, assembled loosely piece by piece, that we find in Kant’s essay or in Rousseau’s *Reveries* or in Wittgenstein’s strange assemblage of scenarios, questions without answers, images and anti-pictures called *The Philosophical Investigations*. The upshot is that Thoreau cannot be excluded from the precincts of philosophy solely on the basis of his relative disinterest in casting his reflections as sustained arguments. Let me continue with another instance of philosophy without argument, the instance of Hamlet.

When Hamlet asks, “to be or not to be”, he is not weighing impartial arguments on the merits of suicide. He is letting dark truths flare out with unrivaled eloquence. He exposes his exposure to a world not ordinarily acknowledged, exposing to us his exposure to what Cora Diamond calls difficult realities. When harsh realities flood and afflict all my hope for serenity, “objective” arguments meant to “explain” or assuage my suffering will be largely inefficual, beside the point, irksome, or patronizing. Hamlet speaks to our vulnerabilities insofar as his speaking exposes his own vulnerabilities. The force of impartial argumentation is nil, and rightly so, when the domain of your bitter afflictions, and my appreciation of them, saturate the tonality of our exchanges. Hamlet is witness to his troubles, exposes his vulnerability to them, and so invites us to inhabit the world of our own difficult vulnerabilities. He is not a meticulous accountant keeping track of malfunctions in the world. The startle and wonder of it all, listening to his exposures, is that his words of dark exaltation fly wildly, elegantly, above and through, those troubles: “What a pity”. Thoreau exclaims, “if the part of Hamlet be left out”, for his words ought to stop us in our tracks -- awaken us to terror but also to the wonders of the human voice and its capacity

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70 Wittgenstein holds that thinking runs astray when “a picture holds us captive.” We might think of pictures as playing a role in static representations, as in picture galleries, where we can take in the whole scene in a glance. Images, in contrast, might be seen as shifting, indefinite, ‘spectral’ items in narrative or poetry, things inchoate and hard to pin down, even while having dreamlike power. See Thoreau, “Autumnal Tints”, *Excursions*, final pages, on images. See also Bence Nannay, “Narrative Pictures,” in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 2009.

71 He belongs shelved with philosophy, as does Henry James, Dostoevsky, and Proust (to name just a few whose identities are wider than any single disciplinary or cultural classification).

72 *Philosophy and Animal Life*, ch 1. The trouble or trembling we undergo is not only the work of a vagrant, flawed subjectivity; troubles also afflict the most unflawed subjectivity. There are troubles rooted in objective realities.

73 *Journals*, March 21, 1840, 1st paragraph.
to mitigate and modulate sheer terror and despair. We are animals who bound through snow beautifully, but we are also animals who launch readily into registers of eloquence.

Hamlet’s voicing of melancholy, doubt, and wonder should not be lost – not lost for philosophy merely for lacking argumentation. Over and over in Thoreau, there are moments of philosophical radiance, joy and exaltation. They do not stand to be confirmed or refuted, but are exposed on their own to stand on their own, for what they are. In the moment, they quiet or arouse quite independently of supportive reasoning. Yet too extended a silence in their presence would fail them. As responsive creatures, we’re moved to speak in memoriam and celebration, in elaboration and repetition, continuing and renewing the moment of their life. We bring words of commemoration and redemption again and again onto this meager stage where they can speak, can be heard, be exposed and seen, once again.

Here again is Thoreau at that place of mourning he transforms through commemorative evocation.

when I was half a mile distant the insignificant stick or sliver which marked the spot looked like a broken spar in the sand. There lay the relics in a certain state, rendered perfectly inoffensive to both bodily and spiritual eye . . . . That dead body possessed the shore as no living one could. [The bones were] alone with the sea . . . whose hollow roar seemed addressed to the ears of the departed.74

Fuller’s placement and aspect are changed. What Thoreau takes as her shark-scored bones yields to infinite communion with the sea’s address. Sorrow and terrible loss are displaced. Against the pull of disheartening if not lethal undertows, Thoreau through his writing inhabits a delightful confluence of wonder, poetry, and philosophy.

74 Cape Cod, p. 123.
§ 7  CONCORD AND COPENHAGEN

Let me round out the plausibility of Thoreau’s full membership in the congress of philosophers with a quick comparison with another literary thinker, a Danish writer and walker as rich in philosophical insight as Nietzsche (with whom we began this essay). In December, 1838, Thoreau wrote out in his Journal a brief but striking philosophical desire:

Could we for a moment drop this by-play – and simply wonder – without reference or inference?  

Some eight months earlier, a literary philosopher from Copenhagen reported in his Journal:  

This morning I saw half a score of geese fly away in crisp cool air. . . . They divided into two flocks arched like a pair of eyebrows above my eyes, which were now gazing into the land of poetry.

We might be surprised that Thoreau bears comparison to Kierkegaard (yet we can read just that in the marvelous entry on Thoreau in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Of course once we think of it, there are intriguing parallels.

Each kept astounding journals, Thoreau starting his at age 20, in 1837. Kierkegaard jotted his first entry at age 21, in 1834. Both were poetic, ethical, political, and religious, and both skewered their fellow citizens with mordant wit. Both were philosophers of the place they inhabited. While their reading made them global and brought the past to their present, Kierkegaard left provincial Copenhagen as seldom as Thoreau left Concord. From the mid 1840’s on, Kierkegaard exposed the sham of his city’s Christendom. Thoreau found the freedom won at Lexington and Concord despoiled when Mexico was invaded and slavery was enforced in Concord and Boston, the latter in the case of Anthony Burns.

75 Journals, December 7th, 1838.
77 I thank Rick Furtak, who noted the proximity of Kierkegaard and Thoreau in his entry for The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy prompting my comparisons here, and who also made suggestions improving this essay.
Kierkegaard dies disowned by the elite of his city at 42, while Thoreau dies almost uneventfully at age 44, his demise overshadowed by The Civil War. Yet he had his part in bringing on that cataclysm.\(^7\)

There are differences, notably, of temperament. Thoreau was not sentimental enough to have written this: “no turtle-dove builds its nest in my branches”.\(^7\) And lacking Thoreau’s marvelous animal exuberance, Kierkegaard could not have given us this:

I saw a fox . . . making across to the hills on my left. As the snow lay five inches deep, he made but slow progress, but it was no impediment to me. So yielding to the instinct of the chase, I . . . bounded away, snuffing the air like a . . . hound.\(^8\)

At a deeper level, there are a number of convergent philosophical motifs whose presence might surprise us. In no special priority, these five stand out:

1) Thoreau said one could find teachers of philosophy but no philosophers in and about Concord. He valued not just a concep­tion of how to live – a map, as it were. He valued its exemplary enactment in the detail of one’s life. Kierkegaard mocked the strictly academic practice of professors of philosophy that had absolutely no bearing on living out one’s convictions in daily life.

2) Thoreau waits for new days to dawn, creation occurring ever and again bequeathed to those with ‘eyes to see’; Kierkegaard’s poetic ‘young man’ awaits a new world delivered in a thunderclap, given in an Augenblick that he calls “repetition”.\(^8\)

\(^7\) Thoreau lived from 1817-1862; Kierkegaard, from 1813-1855. Thoreau starts his journal in 1837; Kierkegaard starts his in 1834. Thoreau’s first essay appears in 1842, the year of John’s death. Kierkegaard publishes Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and Repetition in 1843. In 1846, Thoreau writes Ktaadn, and in 1849 “Civil Resistance” and A Week on the Concord. He retrieves Fuller’s body in 1850. “Slavery in Massachusetts” appeared in 1854. 1857 he meets John Brown. In 1859, he delivers “A Plea for John Brown” to an audience of 2,000 in Boston. Douglass was to have spoken, but after Brown’s capture, fled toward Canada. After Thoreau and others arranged a memorial service in Concord on the day of his hanging, outraged Concord citizens hung Brown in effigy. Kierkegaard was not martyred, but church dignitaries shunned his funeral, and student supporters disrupted the graveside service, protesting church rites they were sure he would despise.

\(^8\) Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals, A Selection, ed. and trans. Alastair Hannahy, Penguin Books, 1996, 9 July 1837, p. 109. Journals, January 30, 1841. Kierkegaard tried to get a taste, not of bounding after a fox, but of the park on horseback, but he was stiff at anything athletic. He lacked a knack for saddles, and switched to carriage rides.

3) For both, the telos of awareness is an earnest openness, a moment for responsibility, not just a moment of cognitive success or of self-interested or rational satisfactions. Kierkegaard calls this subjectivity; Thoreau has no single term to catch this fertile slant of attentiveness.

4) Thoreau asks why George Washington, who never gave his life or word to rid the land of slavery, should be ranked higher than John Brown, who did. Kierkegaard asks why Abraham, who was ready to sacrifice another’s life, should be ranked higher than a common murderer.

5) Maine’s Ktaadn, at the top, is an indifferent, even hostile mountain: spirit exits through a gap in one’s ribs; a frighteningly ‘raw existence’ forces Thoreau to cry out in uncharacteristic dismay, “Contact! Contact! Where are we? What are we?” Kierkegaard calls this onslaught and frightful flight of existence dizziness or anxiety, and places it, like Thoreau, in a dark before the world is born.

We have more than enough here to improvise (on another day) any number of extended conversations.

§ 8 Great Moral Philosophy

There is a tragic undercurrent in at least much of Thoreau’s writing, an undercurrent that travels with a Nietzschean concept of the Dionysian. Thoreau’s writing as resistance to affliction and delivery of redemption is in part a transformation of a Dionysian wild. In bringing out these themes I’ve simultaneously pursued a wider aim. Thoreau’s writing belongs within a broad tradition of moral philosophy that flourishes in the work of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, Hegel and Carlyle, and earlier in the work of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Stanley Bates characterizes that tradition as an exploration of human living aimed at seeing and living it better. This is a tradition more or less lost to 20th Century moral philosophy. Accordingly, if Thoreau is to be woven into a tradition neglected or in decline,

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82 See Charles Larmore, The Romantic Legacy, Columbia, 1996, for the move from the epistemological goal of neutral cognition to the broadly ethical goal of ‘subjective’ responsibility.
83 See Thoreau, “Ktaadn”, Essays, p. 113
retrieving his presence for philosophy is part and parcel of retrieving that broader tradition of, and for, philosophy.

It is a striking fact that since the latter part of the nineteenth century when academic philosophy divided itself into subdivisions and the specialty of moral philosophy was created, almost no one who has practiced that specialty has been a “great” philosopher.86

The occlusion of that older tradition occurs with disciplinary specialization and professionalization. Moral philosophy loses the stature of providing a sweeping vista, or even particularist portrait, that takes up the person in cultural, civic, and inter-personal life, in the way Aristotle or Plato, Montaigne or Seneca might. It shrivels or disappears in our time with the ascendancy of professional philosophy’s numerous and highly specialized sub-fields. It is lost in the competition for curricula space among epistemology, aesthetics, metaphysics, logic, cognitive science, history of philosophy (in its many periods), and endless other proliferating subdivisions. The cosmos and soul, the city and forest, the garden and human are lost.87

Bates doesn’t deny that there have been any number of philosophers concerned with the question of how one should see and live life better, but these thinkers, he says, fall outside what has become the restricted 20th century academic rubric of “moral philosophy.” As he puts it:

Since that time [the latter part of the 19th century], or a bit earlier, almost all of the philosophers who have been most significant in helping general readers to understand how to live their lives would not be classified as ‘moral philosophers.’

Who are these philosophers who are no longer inhabitants in the (now-abandoned) precincts of ‘moral philosophy’? He gives us names:

86 Bates, p. 39
87 Philosophers have much to learn from Robert Pogue Harrison’s Forests: The Shadow of Civilization (Chicago, 1992), The Dominion of the Dead (Chicago, 2003), and Gardens: an Essay on the Human Condition (Chicago, 2008). These brilliant explorations in moral philosophy emerge from the academic precincts not of philosophy but of Comparative Literature, confirming Bates’ thesis.
I think of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Emerson, Thoreau, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Sartre (and of course not all of these would be allowed the name ‘philosopher’ by analytical philosophy). These thinkers tend either to produce narrative structures or to reflect on the narrative structure of human existence, not in order to provide a formula, or a template, of human existence, but to deny the possibility of such a formula.\(^8\)

Thoreau gives us narratives of domesticity (through writing and residing at Walden Pond, establishing a home) and narratives of travel, pilgrimage, or commemoration (*Cape Cod, The Maine Woods, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack*). He delivers narratives of ways of living and not living with others (“Slavery in Massachusetts”, “A Plea for Captain John Brown”, “Resistance to Civil Government”). And he delivers narratives of ways of living with oneself (parts of *Walden*, “Walking” and “Wild Apples”). Furthermore, we find in Thoreau the haunting undertones of tragedy that intimate, as Bates puts it, the impossibility of any simple formula or template to guide seeing and living life in the midst of its ample vicissitudes and terrors.

None of this fits well with contemporary academic models of moral philosophy. There one seeks moral “action guides” and formulas, basic principles and constraining and enabling rights. It continues worthy -- and often vibrant -- debate about the capacity of utilitarian or Kantian or neo-Humean orientations to provide order and guidance. And there are promising debates about virtue theory and investigations of specific virtues (and vices): courage, compassion, and jealousy, for instance. But these efforts are seldom tied into larger understandings of the human, and set aside questions of the tragedy or comedy or melodrama of human life. They tend to duck altogether what Cora Diamond calls ‘the difficulty of reality’ -- its sheer contingency and harsh interruptions.\(^9\)

If Thoreau falls outside the ambit of contemporary academic moral philosophy, he nevertheless falls well within the ambit of moral philosophy in the 19th century sense of the term that brings in

\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) *Philosophy and Animal Life*, 74-8.
Schopenhauer or Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or Levinas, Camus or William James, and Thoreau’s nearest
neighbor, Emerson.

Bates finds Stanley Cavell, in his discussions of Emerson, Nietzsche, and others, confess his
interest in a dimension of moral life that “concerns what used to be called the state of one’s soul” and “the
possibility or necessity of the transforming of oneself and of one’s society . . . .”90 Thoreau’s concern for
the soul and its relation to others, to the wild, and one’s society, is an interest more diffuse and elusive
than more Apollonian investigations, so characteristic of contemporary academic debates, of principles or
law-like frameworks, or of specific virtues, pulled from the flow of ongoing life. But if Thoreau is in fact
working in (and out) towards his soul and others’, towards the transformation of souls, and towards the
resonance and impact of this work in reforming society, then this should secure his eligibility as a “great
moral philosopher” -- a thinker at home in the company of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche or the early Marx as
they write, for instance, on suffering, alienation and redemption.

Thoreau speaks to the state of one’s soul, which is an implicit concession or promise to forego
technical, specialized arguments, say, epistemological ones that contest Kant or Hume on the issue of
value-apprehension, or that explicitly contest Plato or Aquinas on the status of the transcendent. Thoreau
addresses non-specialists, bringing them to issues any person in an inquiring or contemplative or troubled
mood might raise about orientations to a life, about what it is like to see life from unconventional
perspectives in desperate or unanchored times. That sort of address is only minimally argumentative, and
relies on images, pictures, scenarios, narratives, untamed wonder and a glimpse of release from terror. It
is writing that lacks the closure of a blackboard “therefore”. We see (or don’t see), are overwhelmed (or
worried or disappointed) by, Thoreau’s ability to mark a path through life -- and light it for another. He
writes out an invitation to enter a setting, laid out with full justice to its complexity and allure, wherein a
soul might find itself at home despite ineluctable ephemerality, pain, and incompleteness.

90 Stanley Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism*
Thoreau gives us writing that lights up deficient life (or segments of it), that exposes constrictions and corruption in a life, that shows it to be shallow or full of quiet desperation -- all this on display not for casual on-looking or entertainment, not for curiosity or bursts of shallow indignation, but for as much deliverance from affliction as the heart and the pen can provide. We do not destroy affliction through writing but work through its tragic lineaments. We can but receive, listen and see, in the face of that overwhelming devastation that lies outside the ambit of our immediate opportunities for action. We cannot undo past atrocities or cruel accidents of fate or the burdens of mortal being.

We listen, see, and then hope through new perception to acquire if not untroubled delight, then at least a stance beyond indifference, outrage or despair -- if not exactly serenity, then at least affinity, if not full affirmation and love, then acceptance and welcome, however mottled its intensity and eloquence.